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Abstract 
Purpose- This study presents theoretical and empirical arguments for the role of mobile 
telephony in promoting good governance in 47 sub-Saharan African countries for the period 
2000-2012. 
 
Design/methodology/approach- The empirical inquiry uses an endogeneity-robust GMM 
approach with forward orthogonal deviations to analyse the linkage between mobile phone 
usage and the variation in three broad governance categories — political, economic and 
institutional. 
 
Findings- Three key findings are established: First, in terms of individual governance 
indicators, mobile phones consistently stimulated good governance by the same magnitude, 
with the exception of the effect on the regulation component of economic governance.   
Second, when indicators are combined, the effect of mobile phones on general governance is 
three times higher than that on the institutional governance category. Third, countries with 
lower levels of governance indicators are catching-up with their counterparts with more 
advanced dynamics. 
 
Originality/value- The study makes both theoretical and empirical contributions by 
highlighting the importance of various combinations of governance indicators and their 
responsiveness to mobile phone usage.  
 
JEL Classification: G20; O38; O40; O55; P37 
Keywords: comparative study, ICT, IT diffusion and adoption 
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1. Introduction  
 There are at least five main reasons behind the decision to assess the role of mobile 
phones2 in promoting good governance in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  
First, while high-end markets in Asia, Europe and North America are experiencing 
growth stabilisation, African countries still represent substantial growth opportunities in 
mobiles (Asongu, 2018). This position is consistent with Penard et al. (2012) who had earlier 
reported that the development of mobile phones versus internet penetration around the world 
in 2010 has been substantially asymmetric. They noted that while internet and mobile phone 
penetration rates had reached points of saturation in developed nations, African countries 
were experiencing an uneven development in the underlying information and communication 
technologies (ICTs), notably: 9.6 percent for internet penetration and 41 percent for mobile 
penetration.  
 Second, a mid-April 2015 World Bank report on the achievement of Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) targets revealed that poverty has been decreasing in all regions 
of the world with the exception of SSA, with 45 percent of countries in the sub-region off-
track from the MDGs poverty target (World Bank, 2015; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017: 
Bicaba et al., 2017; Asongu et al., 2017). This is despite the sub-region enjoying over two 
decades of economic growth resurgence that began in the mid-1990s (Fosu, 2015a, p. 44). 
Moreover, the importance of institutional governance in the exclusive growth of SSA has 
been the focus of a recent stream of literature, particularly in a book by Fosu (2015b) which 
investigated the role of institutions in Africa’s growth.  
 Third, in light of the above, the quality of government has been substantially 
documented to be linked to more inclusive growth, primarily, in: strengthening the basis for 
societal change (Efobi, 2015) and enhancing living standards through a better management of 
economic resources (Fosu, 2013a, 2013b; Fonchingong, 2014; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014).  
Fourth, the inquiry builds on the growing interest for more scholarly research on the 
development outcomes of mobile phone penetration. Indeed, concern has been raised in some 
academic circles that the burgeoning phenomenon may simply be considered by some 
policymakers as a silver bullet for economic development (Mpogole et al., 2008, p. 71; 
Asongu & De Moor, 2015)3. 
                                                          
2
 The terms, ‘mobile phone penetration’, ‘mobile telephony’, ‘mobiles’ and ‘mobile phones’ are used 
interchangeably throughout the paper to mean the use mobile phones.  
3
 The positioning of the study also departs from recent African literature on the use of information and 
communication technology for social change, doing business and development (Kuada, 2009; 2014; 2015; Tony 
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The fifth reason for justifying the current inquiry is that the evolving literature on 
development externalities of mobile phones has had limited focus on the linkages between 
mobiles and governance in the sub-continent, in spite of the confirmation of the critical role of 
institutions in inclusive human development by Fosu, (2015bc). As far as we have reviewed, 
only four studies have investigated the validity of this proposition in Africa (Snow, 2009; 
Mathias, 2012; Porter et al., 2015; Gagliardone, 2016). Snow (2009) concluded that there is a 
negative relationship between the country’s rate of mobile penetration and its perceived level 
of corruption. Mathias (2012) documented a persistent positive impact of mobile connectivity 
on openness and accountability in Africa. Porter et al. (2015) used data on Ghana, Malawi 
and South Africa to argue that the increasing mobile phone usage in Africa by the youth in 
particular, could be tailored towards a more appealing nexus between practice and policy 
implementation. Gagliardone (2016) evaluated the importance of the interactions between 
mobile-radio and the quality of government in Africa. The results indicated that preventive 
and corrective measures are significantly improved by the underlying connections in Kenya.  
 Noticeably, the above literature leaves room for improvement in at least four areas. 
First, the need for inquiries with potential for more focused policy implications as opposed to 
country-specific studies that have limited policy outcomes (Snow, 2009; Porter et al., 2015). 
Second, while Snow (2009) has exclusively concentrated on corruption, it is important to 
involve more governance concepts because corruption is only one component of institutional 
governance. Third, some studies are either not directly focused on employing the mobile 
phone for better governance (Gagliardone, 2016) or not directly linked to good governance as 
a policy outcome (Porter et al., 2015). Fourth, while Snow (2009) has established a negative 
relationship between mobile phones and corruption, the analysis is statistically fragile because 
it is based on correlations and not causality.  
 The present study bridges the aforementioned gaps by assessing the effect of mobile 
phones on ten separate measures of governance in 47 African countries. The empirical 
evidence is based on an endogeneity-robust Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with 
forward orthogonal deviations.  For this purpose, we first assess the role of mobile phones in 
promoting improvements in three broad governance categories. They are: (i) political 
governance (comprising political stability/no violence and voice & accountability); (ii) 
economic governance (involving government effectiveness and regulation quality) and (iii) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
& Kwan, 2015; Afutu-Kotey et al., 2017; Asongu & Boateng, 2018; Bongomin et al., 2018 ; Gosavi, 2018; 
Hubani & Wiese, 2018; Isszhaku et al., 2018; Minkoua Nzie et al., 2018; Muthinja & Chipeta,  2018; Abor et al., 
2018). 
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institutional governance (encompassing corruption-control and the rule of law). We then 
bundle these individual governance indicators in a robustness check to further investigate how 
our findings differ when the underlying governance variables are combined into  a policy 
index. Such an empirical approach of bundling and unbundling governance indicators in order 
to avail room for more policy implications is consistent with recent literature (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016a, 2017).   
 In order to investigate how the mobile phone usage directly affects selected 
governance dimensions, we employ the system Generalised Method of Moments estimation 
technique for five key reasons. They comprise the fact that it (i)  supports the continuous 
structure of our dataset; (ii) accounts for persistence in the governance outcome variables;  
(iii) retains cross-country variations in the empirical model;  (iv) corrects for biases in the 
difference GMM estimation alternative and  (v) adjusts for endogeneity in data. These points 
are substantiated in the methodology section where we also discuss misspecification problems 
pertaining to identification and how the GMM restrictions help to correct them.  
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 clarifies the concept of 
governance and theoretical underpinnings. Section 3 describes the dataset and methodology. 
Section 4 presents and explains the empirical results while Section 5 provides concluding 
remarks with associated policy implications.  
 
2. Conceptual background and hypotheses development 
2.1 Conceptual background  
 This section will discuss: (i) definitions of governance concepts, (ii) controversial 
positions on the measurement of governance in the literature, (iii) the justification for 
bundling and unbundling governance dimensions in mainstream literature and (iv) the concept 
of mobile (m)-governance. 
 Consistent with Asongu (2016), many definitions of the concept of governance have 
been documented in the literature.  For brevity, this study adopts the following explanations 
from papers published in the past decade:  According to Dixit (2009), economic governance 
can be understood as  ‘…structure and functioning of the legal and social institutions that 
support economic activity and economic transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing 
contracts, and taking collective action to provide physical and organizational infrastructure’4 
(p.5). Fukuyama (2013), explained that the notion of governance is related to the processes 
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and procedures adopted to enhance the ‘state quality’ in terms output, politics and production 
capacity measurements. Tusalem (2015) described governance as a phenomenon that consists 
of: the rule of law, corruption control, regulation quality and bureaucratic effectiveness. As 
far as we have reviewed, the most widely used indicators of governance are abstracted from 
Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) which according to Andrés et al. (2015) can be 
classified into three main areas: (i) ‘political governance’, which is the election and 
replacement of political leaders. It is measured with voice and accountability and political 
stability/non-violence; (ii) ‘economic governance’, which is related to the formulation and 
implementation of policies that deliver high quality public commodities. It is proxied with 
regulation quality and government effectiveness; and (iii) ‘institutional governance’ which is 
defined as the respect of the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between 
them.  It is measured by the extent of deference for the rule of law and corruption-control.  
  The above mentioned governance indicators from Kaufmann et al (2010) have been 
criticized by a number of authors. The most thought-provoking condemnations have been 
from Kurtz and Schrank (2007a and b) who appraised the models, measures and mechanisms 
employed by Kaufmann et al(2010). Their critique resulted in a to-and-fro debate as follows: 
To begin with, Kurtz and Schrank (2007a) questioned the premise under which governance is 
positively linked to economic development by Kaufman et al. They presented a case for re-
examining the over-confidence that the indicators from Kaufman et al are enjoying in 
mainstream literature. They concluded that the underpinning indicators of governance are 
marred by a number of concerns, among others: perceptual biases, conceptual conflation with 
policy choices and sampling adverse selection. In reply to these allegations, Kaufmann et al 
(2007a) provided empirical evidence to demonstrate that the (i) criticisms from antagonistic 
authors on ‘perception-based measurement biases’ in their governance indicators are 
speculative, falsifiable and do not withstand empirical scrutiny;  (ii) short-run nexus between 
governance and growth purported by the other protagonists is conceptually flawed and (iii) 
findings of empirical studies by the contenders on the economic growth-governance 
relationship are not robust to specific conditions in these countries. Kurtz and Schrank 
(2007b) defended their  appraisal on the basis that their initial concerns on measurement and 
conceptual opaqueness significantly build on the debate surrrounding the growth-governance 
nexus. According to these authors, underlying anxieties about ‘potential respondant bias’ are 
not entirely limited to the measurement of government effectivess, but could be extended to 
other variables. Kaufmann et al (2007b) further provided a rejoinder in a second reply where 
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they reiterated the lack of empirical justification for the criticisms advanced by Kurtz and 
Schrank. 
In this paper we adopt the Kaufmann et al (2007a, 2007b, 2010) governance 
indicators,  primarily because of data availability and because to the best of our knwoledge, 
they are the most widely used governance measurements in the literature. As noted in the 
introduction, in order to provide robust findings while  demonstrating the opportunities for 
further policy implications, we bundle our selected individual governance indicators into four 
indices representing: (i) political governance, (ii) economic governance, (iii) institutional 
govenance and (iv) general governance. The technique of bundling and unbundling 
governance indicators is consistent with a stream of African  institutional literature. They 
include articles on revolution empirics in the prediction of the Arab Spring  by Asongu & 
Nwachukwu (2016b);  the role of instutitions in knowledge economy in Africa  by Andrés et 
al (2015); governance mechanisms in the fight against software piracy  by Andrés & Asongu, 
(2013) and crimes/conflicts by Asongu & Kodila-Tedika (2016) in Africa and economic 
governnce as the most important determinants of innovation in Africa by Oluwatobi et al 
(2015).  
 Finally, the concept of e-governance is clarified by Hellstrom (2008). The author 
suggests the phenomenon could be understood as the employment of the various types of 
ICTs for enhancing rewards to parties involved in electronic (e)-governance. The parties 
include businesses, citizens and government units. According to the author, the use of mobile 
phone applications to encourage good governance consists of employing the mobile 
technology to among others, improve public service delivery, citizenary participation and 
respect of instituions within the State.  
 
2.2 Theoretical insights and hypotheses development  
It is important to note that, to the best of our knowledge, no theoretical model has been 
developed on the relationship between mobile phone usage and governance. This is the reason 
why the term “argument” is explicitly added to the title of this paper. Therefore, beyond 
theoretical foundations, providing an empirical insight into new phenomena like mobile 
phone-governance interconnections is important for motivating future theory-building 
exercises. Indeed, Costantini and Lupi, (2005) and Narayan et al., (2011) affirmed that an 
empirical exercise based on sound intuition is a useful scientific activity because “applied 
econometrics” is not exclusively based on the acceptance or rejection of existing theories.  
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Additionally, Hellstrom (2008) remarked that ICTs can be used to improve 
governance dimensions, primarily because they promote  transparency, oppeness and quasi-
free flow of information between institutions and governmnt ministries. According to the 
narrative, the mobile phone has the potential of facilitaing (i) the free flow of information 
between citizens and the government and  (ii) direct participation of citizens in influencing 
decisions that govern them.This involvement is possible through protests organised and 
coordinated with the help of mobile phones or through direct communication with 
government officials with mobile phones. In a nutshell, mobile phones enable converging 
societies that are more connected, participative and informative.  
 Snow (2009, pp. 337-339) has provided theoretical concepts on the potential role of 
mobiles in government effectiveness. The theory maintains that the historic dearth of ICT in 
Africa enabled the elite to enjoy preferential communication and information  services. These 
conditions seriously constrained accountability and transparency, hence providing an enabling 
environment for corruption among the ruling classes. To this end, the author postulated that 
the net impact of the rapid diffusion of mobile phones in Africa is very likely to be a 
reduction in corruption, especially among the ruling elite. It follows that such liberlisation in 
ICT would shed light on the barriers that hitherto shielded corrupt elites, prevented oversight 
with related punishment as well as altered the results of cost-benefits calculations of public 
sector investments. It is important to note that the theory popularised by  Snow (2009) 
focused exclusively on the corruption aspect of institutional governance. We  adopt the key 
ideas of Snow (2009) to substantiate the three propositions investigated in this study. We 
hypothesize  a positive relationship between mobile phones and the development in the three 
major dimensions of governance employed in the current study, namely political governance, 
economic governance and institutional governance.  
 
The mechanisms by which mobile phone promotes good political governance are: “voice & 
accountability” and “political stability”. From the perspective of “voice & accountability”, 
mobile phones can be used to coordinate the organisation of peaceful protests aimed at 
compelling government officials to be truthful and answerable to their citizens.  In the same 
vein, the mobile phone can be used to highlight the extent to which a country’s citizens are 
able to participate in selecting their government and enjoy freedom of expression and 
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membership of different political parties.5 Concerning the view of “political stability”, we 
propose that the rewards of mobile phone penetration in limiting violence at civil protests, 
political rallies and abuse of power by officials, including the Police and the Army outweigh 
the criticism that mobile phones could be used to incite civil rebellion and fuel terrorism. This 
is probably because citizens are increasingly aware of the medium and long term economic 
hardships associated with a destabilisation or overthrow of an elected government by 
unconstitutional means, including coup-d’etat, terrorism and domestic violence.   
 
Hypothesis 1: Mobile phone usage influences good political governance by facilitating a free 
and fair election and replacement of political leaders.   
 
The mechanisms by which mobile phone usage promotes economic governance are: 
government effectiveness and regulation quality. Logically, the expedition and simplification 
of communication between government departments as well as between government officials 
and citizens is essential for greater participation in the design and implementation of 
economic policies.    
 
Hypothesis 2: Mobile phones influence economic governance by expediting the formulation 
and implementation of policies that deliver better public services.  
 
Channels through which such institutional governance is improved are corruption-control and 
adherence to the rule of law. The intuition supporting this third dimension of our proposition 
is broadly consistent with the theoretical underpining of Snow (2009) which we  described in 
previous paragraphs. As a summary of the narrative, ICT has increased transparency, reduced 
corruption and facilitated respect of the rule of law because it has substantially decreased the 
monopoly of preferential communication and information services by a few ruling elite.  
 
                                                          
5
 It is important to note that this manuscript is positioned as an argument. Hence, it is worthwhile to balance the 
narrative with potential counter arguments that can arise from scholarly and policy circles. It may also be argued 
that government selection is by universal suffrage and that voting is not done by means of mobile phones. 
However, the mobile phone can help to facilitate universal suffrage through coordination and communication. It 
is also relevant to mention that, mere possession of a mobile phone does not imply that there is freedom of 
expression. In some countries (e.g., China), the mobile penetration rate is high but still the government is 
criticized of deprivation of human rights.  
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Hypothesis 3: The use of the mobile phones affect institutional governance by enabling the 
citizens and the State to respect insitutions that govern interactions between them.  
 
Generally speaking, we argue that , our hypotheses are consistent with the theory by 
Snow (2009) in the sense that information capture by the ruling elite is a potential source of 
corruption and poor governance metrics (political, economic and institutional). Hence, 
information decentralisation by means of the mobile telephony reduces opportunities for 
depraved institutional practices to take root. These suggestions with associated  theoretical 
underpinnings are in conformity with the bulk of literature on the relationhip between ICTs 
and governance (Suarez, 2006; Boulianne, 2009; Diamond, 2010; Grossman et al., 2014).  
Nevertheless, it is important to balance the theoretical concepts with the stream of 
literature insinuating that ICTs can facilitate violent collective action (Breuer et al., 2012; 
Pierskalla  & Hollenbach, 2013; Weidmann & Shapiro, 2015; Manacorda & Tesei, 2016). It is 
also useful to modify our narrative with some discussion on channels through which mobile 
phones might actually reduce the quality of government. For example, Morozov (2011) noted 
that the use of ICTs by the incumbent government for propaganda is an important connection 
between ICTs and poor governance. Other factors influencing the ICT-poor governance 
relationship may include the extra costs arising from the use of mobile phones to obtain the 
information needed to hold the ruling classes to account for their actions, demand for reforms 
in individual economic empowerment and organise civil protests and political rallies. 
 Sections 1 and 2 have focused on the mobile phone-governance context in Sub-
Saharan Africa in the sense that the argument motivates the present study. However, it is also 
pertinent to elucidate how this logic could be expanded to other regions of the world 
characterised by lower levels of mobile phone penetration and poor governance. The 
extension does not imply that the mobile phone will equally improve all dimensions of 
governance under consideration in these further regions. This is essentially because the 
economic development paradigms of countries differ. For instance, a country can prioritise 
political governance while others put emphasis on economic governance in their development 
plan. Examples with which to illustrate this point are the two dominant models of economic 
development in the world, namely: the Washington Consensus and the Beijing Model. 
According to recent literature (Asongu & Ssozi, 2016), the Washington Consensus can be 
defined as “liberal democracy, private capitalism and priority in political rights” while the 
Beijing Model can be defined as “de-emphasised democracy, state capitalism and priority in 
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economic rights”. Within the context of this study (i.e. the definitions provided in Section 
2.1), political rights are consistent with political governance whereas economic rights are in 
line with economic governance dynamics.  
 Even within a given dimension of governance such as political governance (i.e. 
consisting of political stability and “voice and accountability”), priorities of the two dominant 
models may still differ. For instance, China which promotes the Beijing Model enjoys better 
political stability than most African countries which are largely following the prescriptions of 
the Washington Consensus  that emphasises the relevance of “voice and accountability” in 
political governance. Nevertheless, we propose that the framework underlying this study can 
be extended to countries with development paradigms and dynamics of governance 
comparable with those in the sub-Saharan African economies. 6.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
 The study investigates a panel of 47 countries in SSA with data from African 
Development Indicators of the World Bank for the period 2000-2012. Of the 49 existing 
countries in SSA, South Sudan and Somalia are excluded from the sample because of data 
availability constraints.  In line with the discourse in Section 2, six individual governance 
indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010) are used as dependent variables in the main regression 
specifications and four additional governance indices, bundled by principal component 
analysis (PCA) are used for robustness checks. The six individual governance indicators 
comprise:  (i) voice and accountability; and (ii) political stability/no violence (which proxy 
political governance); (iii) government effectiveness and (iv) regulation quality (which 
measure economic governance); (v) corruption-control and (vi) the rule of law (which 
captures institutional governance). These indicators have been widely used in governance 
empirical studies in the past ten years (see for example Gani, 2011; Andrés et al., 2015; 
Yerrabit & Hawkes, 2015; Ajide & Raheem, 2016a, 2016b).  
The independent variable of interest i.e., the mobile technology variable is proxied by 
the mobile phone penetration rate (per 100 people). This decision is consistent with recent 
knowledge economy literature (Tchamyou, 2017).  
                                                          
6
 Asongu and le Roux (2018) have recently built on these governance dynamics and the two dominant models to 
explain Africa’s extreme poverty tragedy.  
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The selected control variables are: (i) economic growth, (ii) population growth, (iii) 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and (iv) foreign aid. The choice of these control variables is 
informed by discussion in the literature. For example, the variables for economic growth and 
population growth were recently used to control the movement of governance dynamics in the 
prediction of the Arab Spring (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b). We expect a positive 
relationship between these variables and our choice of governance metrics because while 
higher income-levels are associated with better governance ethics, more resources are 
expected to be allocated for improving governance standards with growing population. This 
optimistic narrative should be mitigated by the fact that a substantial increase in the number of 
inhabitants may also infringe on the ability of a government to effectively manage the 
demands of a rising population. Financial globalisation has been confirmed to raise 
governance standards in developing countries (Lalountas et al., 2011). By contrast, the effect 
of foreign aid may either be positive or negative in light of the conflicting literature on the 
relationship between foreign aid and governance in Africa (Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu 
& Nwachukwu, 2016c). For instance, whereas Okada and Samreth (2012) found that foreign 
aid reduced corruption in developing countries, Asongu and Nwachukwu, (2016c) concluded 
that foreign aid undermined governance principles in recipient Africa countries. However, we 
expect the sign in our current analysis to be negative in line with the Asongu and Nwachukwu 
study because this study focused exclusively on African economies and also uses all the six 
individual governance indicators employed in the current inquiry.   
 The definition and sources of variables are disclosed in Appendix 1, while the 
corresponding summary statistics are provided in Appendix 2. The correlation matrix is 
presented in Appendix 3.  
The summary statistics show that the Means of the variables are comparable and in the 
light of corresponding variations, we can be confident that reasonable expected relationships 
with our selected governance dimensions would emerge. The primary purpose of the 
correlation matrix is to inform on potential issues of multicollinearity. We notice that 
concerns about degrees of substitution among variables are apparent among governance 
variables. However, consistent with the narrative in Section 2 on the need to bundle and 
unbundle governance indicators, conceptual priority takes precedence over degrees of 
substitution. The concern about multicollinearity is not of a nature to bias estimated 
coefficients because the governance indicators are used as dependent variables in distinct 
specifications.  
13 
 
It is important to clarify that some governance indicators have figures that exceed the 
standardised range of -2.5 to +2.5, notably: non principal component (PC)-augmented 
variables and PC-augmented variables. With regard to PC-augmented variables, contingent on 
eigenvalues and percentage of variation corresponding to the retained first PC, variables from 
PCs can have ranges that are higher than those apparent in their constituent components. 
Hence, -4.049 corresponding to a PC-augmented variable is not a cause for concern. With 
regard to non PC-augmented variables, some negative political stability observations for 
Sudan exceed the lower limit of -2.5. Fortunately, this does not affect the findings because the 
observations are very close to the lower limit and occur exclusively in three out of our twelve 
years of study — 2009, 2010 and 2011.  
 
3.2 Estimation technique  
3.2.1 Specification  
 The study uses a GMM approach for five main reasons. First, the procedure of 
estimation is a good fit because of the presence of persistent dependent variables. As observed 
in Appendix 4, the rule of thumb requirement for evidence of persistence (0.800) is apparent 
because the lowest correlation coefficient between governance variables and their 
corresponding lagged values is 0.965. Second, the number of countries (N) is higher than the 
number of years per country in a given time series (T). Hence, the N(47)>T(12) condition for 
the application of the GMM technique is satisfied. Third, the approach does not eliminate 
cross-country variations. Fourth, the estimation technique corrects for endogeneity in all 
regressors, primarily by controlling for time invariant omitted variables. Fifth, consistent with 
Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4), the system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & 
Bond, 1998) is preferred to the difference estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991). According to 
Asongu and De Moor (2016), the first-two are requirements for adopting the approach while 
the last-three are rewards linked to using the estimation strategy. 
 The current inquiry is an extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) based on forward 
orthogonal deviations technique suggested by Roodman (2009ab).  The key properties of the 
resulting GMM- estimation method with forward orthogonal deviations have been 
documented by Love and Zicchino (2006) and Baltagi (2008). They include its ability to 
restrict over-identification and/or limit instrument proliferation. In these previous studies, a 
two-step approach is preferred to the one-step because it accurately accounts for 
heteroscedasticity. In essence, the one-step technique is homoscedasticity-consistent. In 
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principle, we do not need any test for heteroscedasticity to justify the two-step approach 
because; the assumption of homoscedasticity (or homogeneity of variance) is less realistic 
than the assumption of heteroscedasticity (or heterogeneity of variance). 
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where tiG ,
 
is a governance indicator (political, economic or institutional governance) of 
country i
 
at  period t ; 0  is a constant;
 
 represents the coefficient of autoregression;  M , 
Mobile phone penetration; W  is the vector of control variables  (GDP growth, population 
growth, foreign investment, and foreign aid),
 
i
 
is the country-specific effect, t
 
is the time-
specific constant  and ti ,  is the error term.  
It is necessary to test for stationarity in the variables. The unit root tests 
overwhelmingly show that the variables are stationary. The unit root tests are based on Im-
Pesaran-Shin and Fisher types because the Breitung and Levin-Lin and Chu tests require a 
balanced panel dataset (see Tchamyou et al., 2018; Tchamyou, 2018a)7.  
 
3.2.2 Identification simultaneity and exclusion restrictions 
 In accordance with recent literature (see Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014; Asongu & De 
Moor, 2017; Tchamyou, 2018b; Boateng et al., 2018), all independent variables are 
considered as either predetermined or potentially endogenous. Within this framework, the 
method for treating them is the gmmstyle. Time-invariant omitted variables are treated as 
strictly exogenous and the procedure for treating the corresponding ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, 
eq(diff))’. This is specifically because it is very unlikely for time-invariant omitted variables 
to become endogenous after first-difference (see Roodman, 2009b). In the light of the 
identification process, all independent variables are potentially endogenous. The concern of 
endogeneity is addressed in two ways. First, we control for time effects in order to account 
                                                          
7
 Due to space constraint, the results of our panel unit root tests are not presented here, but are available from the 
lead author on request.  
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for errors associated with the unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and reverse causality. 
Second, we use lagged variables as instruments for variables that are forward-differenced. 
 Theoretically, fixed effects which are expected to affect the estimated relationships are 
eliminated by employing Helmet transformations on the regressors (see Arellano & Bover, 
1995; Love & Zicchino, 2006). The conversion consists of employing forward mean-
differencing of the indicators. This means that all future observations are subtracted from the 
lagged indicators, instead of deducting past observations from contemporary ones. Such an 
alteration enables parallel or orthogonal conditions between the forward-differenced 
indicators and lagged values. Irrespective of the number of lags, in order to avoid the loss of 
data, the underlying transformations are performed for all observations, except for the last 
observation for each country, “and because lagged observations do not enter the formula, they 
are valid as instruments” (see Roodman, 2009b, p. 104; Asongu & De Moor, 2017). 
 With respect to exclusion restrictions, time-invariant omitted indicators that are 
considered as strictly exogenous affect governance variables exclusively through the 
suspected endogenous indicators. The validity of the exclusion restriction is investigated with 
the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for the exogeneity of instruments. Accordingly, in order 
for the dependent variable to be fully explained by time-invariant omitted indicators through 
the potential endogenous mechanisms, the null hypothesis for the DHT should not be rejected. 
Hence, the DHT procedure is used to examine if time-invariant omitted indicators exhibit 
strict exogeneity by explaining governance measurements solely through the endogenous 
channels or variables. Therefore, in the results that are reported in the following section, the 
validity of the exclusion restriction is confirmed if the null hypotheses of DHT corresponding 
to IV (year, eq(diff)) are not rejected. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Presentation of results 
 Consistent with Tchamyou and Asongu (2017), the study uses the following 
information criteria to assess the validity of models: First, the alternative hypothesis of the 
second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference which informs on 
whether the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals should be rejected. Second, a check 
on the validity of instruments is based on the alternative hypotheses of the Sargan and Hansen 
over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests. Their null hypotheses are that the instruments are 
valid and not correlated with the error terms. Accordingly, the Hansen (Sargan) OIR test is 
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robust (resp. not robust) but weakened (resp not weakened) by instruments. It is specifically 
for the interest of limiting instrument proliferation that specifications have been tailored to 
meet the rule of thumb requirement that restricts over-identification, notably:  the instruments 
are lower than the number of countries in every specification. Third, in order to ascertain the 
validity of Hansen OIR results, the OIR tests are further examined with the Difference in 
Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments. Fourth, we also provide a Fisher test that 
assesses the joint validity of estimated coefficients.  
 The following three findings can be confirmed from Table 1. First, mobile phones 
consistently promote good governance by the same magnitude, with the exception of 
regulation quality for which the effect is nearly doubled. Unfortunately, the effect on 
regulation quality is not feasible because of the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals. 
Second, there is some degree of convergence in governance metrics given that the absolute 
value of the coefficients on the lagged endogenous variable is between 0 and 18. In summary 
all the three hypotheses investigated in this paper are valid because the mobile phone has 
positive effects on political governance, economic governance and institutional governance. 
Third, most of the significant control variables have the expected signs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 The interested reader can find more insights into the computation of the implied rate of convergence in Asongu 
(2014).  
17 
 
Table 1: The mobile phone and governance standards 
       
 Dependent variable:  governance indicators 
 
  
 Political Governance  Economic Governance  Institutional Governance  
       
 Political 
Stability 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Government  
Effectiveness 
Regulation 
Quality  
Corruption-
Control  
Rule of Law  
       
Constant  0.010 -0.064** -0.162*** -0.189*** -0.128*** -0.252*** 
 (0.884) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
Political Stability (-1) 0.850*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Voice and Accountability (-1) --- 0.987*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Government Effectiveness (-1) --- --- 0.858*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
Regulation Quality (-1) --- --- --- 0.858*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
Corruption-Control (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.814*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Rule of Law (-1) --- --- --- --- --- 0.897*** 
      (0.000) 
Mobile Phone Penetration   0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.063) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Economic Prosperity (GDPg)  0.003 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.0002 -0.001** 0.00006 
 (0.117) (0.009) (0.002) (0.716) (0.036) (0.910) 
Population Growth  -0.028 0.042*** 0.026* 0.025** -0.017 0.047*** 
 (0.256) (0.000) (0.067) (0.010) (0.226) (0.000) 
Foreign Direct Investment  0.0002 -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0006 0.001*** 
 (0.700) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.135) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid -0.0001 0.0009*** -0.0006** -0.0008** -0.0001 -0.0007** 
 (0.879) (0.004) (0.032) (0.047) (0.778) (0.011) 
       
AR(1) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.001) 
AR(2) (0.885) (0.449) (0.166) (0.096) (0.347) (0.620) 
Sargan OIR (0.254) (0.000) (0.798) (0.000) (0.895) (0.482) 
Hansen OIR (0.369) (0.475) (0.628) (0.466) (0.568) (0.193) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.654) (0.246) (0.513) (0.834) (0.932) (0.199) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.235) (0.621) (0.590) (0.250) (0.288) (0.272) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.422) (0.515) (0.599) (0.290) (0.531) (0.233) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.330) (0.388) (0.518) (0.629) (0.498) (0.255) 
       
Fisher  328.69*** 905.55*** 225.30*** 344.21*** 201.10*** 240.85*** 
Instruments  31 31 31 31 31 31 
Countries  47 47 47 47 47 47 
Observations  413 413 413 413 413 413 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. There is a difference between the total number of 
observations in the regression output and the total number of observations disclosed in the summary statistics is because of concerns about 
missing observations. The GMM strategy eliminates missing observations because lagged variables are used as instruments. (-1) stands for 
the lagged dependent variable.  
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4.2 Robustness checks  
 We employ principal component analysis (PCA) to bundle the individual governance 
indicators into four indices, namely: political, economic, institutional and general 
governances. The procedure has been employed in recent African governance literature by 
Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016b). PCA is a statistical technique that is often employed to 
reduce a large set of correlated indicators into a small set of uncorrelated variables called 
principal components (PCs) which represent most of the variation in the original dataset.  
Consequently, we condense the six individual governance measures to one common factor - 
general governance. Therefore, the estimated general governance variable is a composite 
index consisting of the following six dynamics: (i) political stability, (ii) voice and 
accountability, (iii) government effectiveness, (iv) regulation quality, (v) rule of law and (vi) 
corruption-control.  
 We use the Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) criterion to retain common factors.  Both 
authors recommended that only PCs which have an eigenvalue that is greater than the Mean 
or one should be kept. For instance, in Table 2, it can be observed that first PC in the General 
governance model (G.Gov) has an eigenvalue of 4.892 and accounts for more than 81 percent 
of variations in the six constituent variables.  Similarly, the first principal components for 
political governance (Polgov), economic governance (Econgov) and institutional governance 
(Instgov) have eigenvalues (total variations) of 1.671, 1.878 and 1.861(83.5 percent, 93.9 
percent and 93.0 percent) respectively.  
As documented by Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016b), a number of issues may arise 
when variables that are derived from other regressions are employed in further empirical 
modelling. They noted that problems relating to efficiency, consistency and validity of 
inferences were first documented by Pagan (1984, p. 242). Pagan recognised that whereas 
two-step estimators are consistent and efficient, few provide valid inferences. The narrative is 
in accordance with a broad stream of studies on the subject, notably: Oxley and McAleer 
(1993), McKenzie and McAleer (1997), Ba and Ng (2006) and Westerlund and Urbain 
(2013a).  
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Table 2: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix (Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.Gov) 0.395 0.372 0.411 0.426 0.439 0.404 0.815 0.815 4.892 
Second  PC -0.037 0.873 -0.357 -0.303 0.037 -0.124 0.067 0.883 0.407 
Third PC 0.747 -0.035 0.157 -0.131 -0.086 -0.626 0.052 0.935 0.314 
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.835 0.835 1.671 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.164 1.000 0.328 
          
First PC 
(Econgov) 
--- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.939 0.939 1.878 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.060 1.000 0.121 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.930 0.930 1.861 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.069 1.000 0.138 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Polgov (Political 
Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Econgov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC.  
  
Reflecting the underlying concern on the use of PC derived governance variables in 
the context of this inquiry, Westerlund and Urbain (2012, 2013b) have built on previous 
studies (Pesaran, 2006; Stock & Watson, 2002; Bai, 2003; Bai, 2009; Greenaway-McGrevy et 
al., 2012) to confirm that normal inferences are possible with PC-factor augmented 
regressions if estimated coefficients converge to their true values at the rate NT  , (with T 
being the number of time series and N denoting cross-section observations). While the authors 
have suggested that N and T should be sufficiently large for this convergence to be feasible, 
they have stopped short of eliciting how ‘large is large’. Within the framework of this study, 
we are confronted with two major problems. First, we cannot increase N further because we 
have engaged all existing 47 countries in SSA with adequate data on our key variables — 
governance and mobile phone penetration rate. Second, extending T further could result in 
instrument proliferation that might bias estimated results. Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016b) 
confirmed using the same governance variables (albeit with lower N and T) that inferences 
are not substantially different, irrespective of whether bundled and unbundled governance 
indicators are used. They discussed some of the estimation issues surrounding the validity of 
PC-augmented (or derived) variables, including the use of GMM technique. 
Table 3 provides the results of our robustness check based on the bundled governance 
indices. Three major findings are uncovered.  First, with the exception of political governance 
for which the effect of the mobile phone is not significant and the economic governance 
model which is not valid, corresponding impacts on the other governance indicators are 
positive. The magnitude of the impact on general governance is three times as high as that on 
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institutional governance. Second, based on the lagged endogenous variables, while the 
influence corresponding to political governance is not stationary, the effects of other 
governance indicators are static in the sense that the estimated coefficients are less than one. 
Third, most of the significant control variables have expected signs.  
 
Table 3: The mobile phone and bundled governance indices  
 
  
 Dependent variable: Governance indices 
     
 
Political Governance  Economic 
Governance  
Institutional 
Governance  
General 
Governance  
     
Constant  -0.086* -0.197*** -0.219*** -0.224*** 
 (0.067) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) 
Political Governance  (-1) 1.010*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000)    
Economic Governance  (-1) --- 0.876*** --- --- 
  (0.00)   
Institutional Governance  (-1) --- --- 0.910*** --- 
   (0.000)  
General Governance  (-1) --- --- --- 0.942*** 
    (0.000) 
Mobile Phone Penetration   0.0001 0.003*** 0.001** 0.003*** 
 (0.849) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) 
Economic Prosperity (GDPg)  0.003 0.001 -0.002** 0.002* 
 (0.153) (0.191) (0.015) (0.082) 
Population Growth  0.019 0.071*** 0.056** 0.085*** 
 (0.306) (0.002) (0.014) (0.006) 
Foreign Direct Investment  -0.001*** 0.003*** 0.001** 0.0003 
 (0.009) (0.000) (0.011) (0.635) 
Foreign Aid 0.002*** -0.001** -0.0009 -0.108* 
 (0.000) (0.032) (0.142) (0.061) 
     
AR(1) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2) (0.616) (0.032) (0.150) (0.198) 
Sargan OIR (0.045) (0.237) (0.962) (0.960) 
Hansen OIR (0.667) (0.578) (0.713) (0.637) 
     
DHT for instruments     
(a)Instruments in levels     
H excluding group (0.816) (0.559) (0.584) (0.385) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.457) (0.500) (0.652) (0.693) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))     
H excluding group (0.599) (0.302) (0.833) (0.873) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.576) (0.781) (0.417) (0.289) 
     
Fisher  671.83*** 413.52*** 205.90*** 806.32*** 
Instruments  31 31 31 31 
Countries  47 47 47 47 
Observations  413 413 413 413 
     
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; 
b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. There is a difference between the total 
number of observations in the regression output and the total number of observations disclosed in the summary statistics is because of 
concerns about missing observations. The GMM strategy eliminates missing observations because lagged variables are used as instruments. 
(-1) stands for the lagged dependent variable.  
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4.3 Further discussion of results 
 In this section we discuss the: (i) implications of the estimated coefficients, (ii) 
possible channels via which the mobile improves governance and (iii) theoretical 
contributions to the ICT-governance literature.  
 First, the following points are noteworthy on the interest of bundling governance 
indicators: The insignificant effect of the political governance index despite the statistical 
significance of its constituents implies that using the term ‘political governance’ 
interchangeably with ‘voice and accountability’ and political stability/no violence may be 
inappropriate when discussing linkages between the mobile phone and governance standards 
in SSA. The inference is that the generalisations that mobiles could be used to promote higher 
morals in broadly defined metrics of political governance are not acceptable unless they are 
substantiated with empirical research findings. Moreover, extreme caution must be taken 
when reforms to the general political environment is based on findings obtained from 
extrapolating its constituent indicators. Research aimed at explaining why the effect of mobile 
phones on the composite measure of political governance is unimportant whereas the 
influence on its basic components is noteworthy could be the objective of future work. The 
inconsistency of the economic governance model is driven primarily by the invalidity of the 
regulation quality model. Finally, the observation that the impact of mobiles on general 
governance is three times that on the institutional governance measure is not surprising. This 
is because the former combines three governance dynamics, namely: institutional, political 
and economic governances. It follows that general governance is fundamentally driven by 
institutional governance in the mobile-governance nexus. Given that corruption- control is a 
component of institutional governance, the evidence is broadly consistent with recent African 
institutional literature that has established corruption-control to be the  most significant tool in 
fighting conflicts/crimes (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016) and software piracy (Asongu & 
Andrés, 2013). Nevertheless, the significant effect of mobiles on general governance in spite 
of its minor association with some of on its constituent elements is an indication that mobile 
phone usage by itself may not encourage the adoption of good governance ethics in all of its 
key dimensions. However, our findings show that a greater rate of diffusion of mobile phones 
enables good institutional governance practices, presumably by improving the design and 
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implementation of the rule of law as well as the ability of the authorities to detect and punish 
corrupt behaviour. This latter perspective is consistent with Snow (2009, pp. 337-339).  
Second, we now turn our attention to the possible channels via which the mobile 
phone can reduce the monopoly of information with concomitant improvement in governance 
values. As observed by Hellstrom (2008) on corruption-control, there are five important 
reasons for the positive linkage between mobile phones and governance dynamics. They 
involve (i) better access to timely and accurate information, (ii) a speedy adoption of policies, 
(iii) increased participation of citizens in the design of institutions that govern them, (iv) 
improved interaction between institutions and government officials as well as between the 
authorities and their citizens and  (v) a more realistic cost-benefit calculations for investments.  
 Third, while our findings are in line with theoretical underpinnings from Snow (2009), 
it is also important to discuss how our findings contribute to the mobile phone-governance 
literature, notably in terms of:  convergence and information asymmetry.  
 Initially, we found from the GMM results that countries with lower levels of 
governance are catching-up their counterparts with higher governance values. This catch-up 
process is known as convergence. The findings have also contributed to the theoretical 
foundations of catch-up literature by extending the mainstream outcome variable from GDP 
per capita to other development indicators like governance. Indeed, the  theoretical concepts 
of cross-country income catch-up that have been documented within the framework of 
neoclassical growth models (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956; Baumol, 1986; Barro, 1991; Mankiw 
et al., 1992; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995; Fung, 2009) have recently been extended to 
other development fields: financial markets (Narayan et al., 2011; Bruno et al., 2012), 
knowledge economy (Asongu, 2017) and inclusive human development (Mayer-Foulkes, 
2010).   
Additionally, we reported that, mobile phones facilitate information sharing. Such 
helps to mitigate information asymmetry for better oversight by households, public officials 
and civil society. The fact that the mobile phone has been documented to be more positively 
correlated with the informal sector compared to the formal (Asongu, 2013) implies that a civil 
society that traditionally operates in the informal economic sector could also enhance the 
adoption of good governance practices by means of the mobile telephony. In a nutshell, the 
mobile phone helps to information asymmetry by ensuring that ‘governance cost’ is 
minimised and resources are allocated more efficiently. This is broadly supported by theories 
on information asymmetry in the banking sector documented by Claus and Grimes (2003).  
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As a caveat to the study, critics may maintain that our findings on the causal 
relationship between mobile phone usage and governance are doubtful. This is essentially 
because even with the GMM and the inclusion of control variables, the findings may not 
necessarily be causal. One reason for this shortcoming is that mobile phones could merely 
coincide with other antecedent factors with which its diffusion is highly correlated, namely: 
internet connectivity and social media. Given that our regression models do not explicitly 
control for social media and the internet and owing to their apparently high correlations with 
mobile phone penetration, we ran several falsification tests in order to assess whether other 
technological factors drive governance. For example, when mobile phone usage is replaced 
with internet penetration rate, the later significantly affects all dimensions of governance 
positively. We could not find comparative data on social media with the same periodicity, 
2000-2012. We found Facebook penetration data only for the year 2012 and could not find 
Twitter penetration data. Hence, since internet penetration has been shown to significantly 
influence governance dynamics, the allegation of a causal linkage between mobile phones and 
good governance may be questionable. However, it is reasonable to propose that mobile 
phone usage has a positive relationship with governance ethics. This clarification and the 
confirmation of such a positive relationship in our empirical study are not inconsistent with 
the title of this study: “the mobile phone as an argument for good governance”. Nonetheless, 
the term “argument” does not preclude a robust relationship, simply because causality cannot 
be unequivocally established. 
 
 
5. Concluding implications, caveats and future directions 
 This study has presented theoretical and empirical arguments for the role of the mobile 
telephony in promoting good governance in 47 sub-Saharan African countries for the period 
2000-2012. The empirical evidence is based on GMM with forward orthogonal deviations. 
After presenting theoretical frameworks, we have proceeded to discussing the empirical 
findings by first employing six individual governance indicators and then bundling these into 
composite indices to make our arguments more robust while at the same time increase the 
subtlety in our empirical analysis.  
 The following findings are established. First, with unbundled governance indicators, 
mobile phones consistently raised the various dimensions of governance by the same 
magnitude, with the exception of the measure of regulation quality where the effect is 
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doubled, although the regression model was shown to be invalid.  Second, when indicators are 
bundled, with the exclusions of political governance index for which the effect of mobile 
phone is not statistically significant and the economic governance model which is statistically 
inaccurate, corresponding influences on the other indices of governance are positive. Indeed, 
the estimated positive effect on general governance is three times higher than that on 
institutional governance index. It follows that general governance is fundamentally driven by 
institutional governance in the mobile-governance nexus. Third, countries with lower levels of 
governance dynamics are catching-up their counterparts with higher governance values. Three 
other points which were highlighted in the paper include: (i) its contribution to the theoretical 
literature on mobile phone-governance nexus, (ii) the importance of bundling individual 
governance indicators into various composites indices and (iii) the channels through which 
the mobile phone could potentially raise governance standards.  
 As a main caveat the number of observations described in the summary statistics is 
higher than those reported in the estimation output. In the regression analysis, the missing 
observations are automatically dropped by the econometrics software. Hence, we have no 
possibility of knowing which observations are dropped in order to align the number of 
observations provided in the summary statistics with those disclosed in the results output. 
This has been clarified in the caveat section. 
 Future studies within the scope of this inquiry would improve the extant literature by 
assessing how the diffusion of knowledge or other knowledge economy variables affect the 
established positive mobile-governance relationship. Reverse causality could also be a 
problem because Buys et al. (2009) have made the case that better governance practices also 
contribute to deeper mobile penetration in some markets. Moreover, explaining why the 
impact of mobile phones on political governance index is insignificant whereas the influence 
on constituent indicators is statistically significant could be the objective of future research. 
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Appendices   
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  (Measurements) Sources 
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PolSta 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Voice & 
Accountability  
V&A “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, 
freedom of association and a free media”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Political 
Governance  
Polgov First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & 
Accountability. The process by which those in authority are  
selected and replaced. 
           PCA 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 
Gov. E 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality 
of public services, the quality and degree of independence 
from political pressures of the civil service, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Regulation  
Quality  
RQ “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic 
Governance  
Econgov “First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness and 
Regulation Quality. The capacity of government to formulate 
& implement policies, and to deliver services”.  
              PCA 
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Corruption-
Control  
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Institutional 
Governance  
Instgov First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption-
Control. The respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
    
General 
Governance  
G.gov First Principal Component of Political, Economic and 
Institutional Governances   
PCA 
    
Mobile phones  Mobile Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
GDP growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Population 
growth  
Popg Population growth rate (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign 
investment  
FDI Foreign Direct Investment inflows (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign aid    Aid Total Development Assistance (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  PCA: Principal Component Analysis.  
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics (2000-2012) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Political Stability -0.491 0.901 -2.660 1.192 564 
Voice & Accountability  -0.617 0.721 -2.175 0.990 564 
Political Governance  0.066 1.231 -2.653 2.583 564 
Government Effectiveness  -0.737 0.588 -1.960 0.934 563 
Regulation Quality  -0.676 0.599 -2.260 0.983 564 
Economic Governance  0.084 1.278 -2.886 3.808 563 
Rule of Law -0.704 0.624 -2.113 1.056 564 
Control of Corruption  -0.616 0.574 -1.705 1.249 564 
Institutional Governance 0.070 1.302 -2.391 3.766 564 
General Governance 0.130 2.078 -4.567 5.561 563 
Mobile phone penetration  23.774 28.170    0.000 147.20 560 
GDP growth  4.807 5.973 -32.832 63.380 604 
Population growth  2.327 0.920 -1.081 6.576 564 
Foreign Direct Investment inflows 5.332 8.738 -6.043 91.007 603 
Foreign aid   11.686 14.214 -0.253 181.19 604 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix 
                
Governance variables Control variables Mobile  
Political governance  Economic governance  Institutional governance       Phones  
PS VA Polgov GE RQ Econgo
v 
CC RL Instgov G.gov GDPg Popg FDI Aid   
1.000 0.663 0.908 0.642 0.598 0.643 0.647 0.777 0.739 0.801 -0.005 -0.242 -0.012 -0.142 0.338 PS 
 1.000 0.915 0.767 0.759 0.791 0.682 0.813 0.776 0.874 0.047 -0.209 -0.023 -0.029 0.304 VA 
  1.000 0.774 0.745 0.788 0.729 0.872 0.831 0.919 0.023 -0.247 -0.019 -0.093 0.351 Polgov 
   1.000 0.861 0.965 0.827 0.894 0.894 0.935 0.015 -0.336 -0.100 -0.206 0.359 GE 
    1.000 0.964 0.717 0.835 0.806 0.892 0.030 -0.185 -0.110 -0.217 0.337 RQ 
     1.000 0.801 0.896 0.881 0.947 0.023 -0.271 -0.109 -0.219 0.361 Econgov 
      1.000 0.851 0.963 0.884 -0.054 -0.291 -0.077 -0.115 0.319 CC 
       1.000 0.961 0.966 -0.001 -0.254 -0.064 -0.148 0.346 RL 
        1.000 0.961 -0.029 -0.284 -0.074 -0.137 0.346 Instgov 
         1.000 0.005 -0.284 -0.073 -0.160 0.373 G.gov 
          1.000 0.282 0.001 0.087 -0.036 GDPg 
           1.000 0.077 0.363 -0.341 Popg 
            1.000 0.317 0.073 FDI 
             1.000 -0.227 Aid 
              1.000 Mobile 
                
PS: Political Stability/Non violence. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: 
Regulation Quality. Econgov: Economic Governance. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law. Instgov: Institutional Governance. G.Gov: 
General Governance. GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: Population growth. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment inflows. Aid: Foreign aid. Mobile: 
Mobile Phone penetration.  
 
Appendix 4: Persistence of the dependent variables  
           
 Political Governance  Economic Governance  Institutional Governance   
 PS VA Polgov GE RQ Ecogov CC RL Instgov G.gov 
           
PS(-1) 0.965          
VA(-1)  0.982         
Polgov(-1)   0.981        
GE(-1)    0.979       
RQ(-1)     0.981      
Econgov(-1)      0.986     
CC(-1)       0.967    
RL(-1)        0.985   
Instgov(-1)         0.984  
G.gov(-1)          0.990 
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PS: Political Stability/Non violence. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: 
Regulation Quality. Ecogov: Economic Governance. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law. Instgov: Institutional Governance. G.Gov: 
General Governance.  
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